Justice Policy Committee
May 23, 2017, 11 am
Deputation for Bill 132
Current law, as reflected in Section 79.16 of the OEB Act and O. Reg. 95/05 and as articulated in the OEB’s Standard Supply Service Code, the RPP Manual, and the Retail Settlement Code all require the Regulated Price Plan (RPP) rates to recover the full cost of power (as reflected in HOEP and GA).
Despite all of that, the existing RPP rate effective May 1 recovers less than the full cost.
This site was hacked at least twice recently. Malicious code was redirecting traffic and caused the site to be taken down for several days. The malware has been removed. Thanks for your patience.
Post Script: updated March 13
One of the general themes of this website is to document how public policy debates over energy in Ontario don’t obviously display the collective wisdom to correctly identify even short-run cause and effect relationships. One example of this deficiency relates to labour compensation rates in the utility sector. Is executive compensation at OPG and Hydro One causing rates in Ontario to soar (or is executive compensation there generally a good deal for ratepayers?) Here is a discussion I had with radio host Tom McConnell on February 2 starting at about 10 minutes after 10am. A short summary with time stamps follows. Continue reading ‘Compensation Pain (podcast)’ »
Down in the polls, embattled over hydro rates, and about to face the voters, two Ontario premiers in recent years opted for panic-inspired electricity sector interventions that resulted in long-term harm. Just before the 2003 election, Premier Eves imposed a rate freeze that destroyed the electricity market and rang up the deficit by about a billion dollars a year for several years. Just before the 2011 election, Premier McGuilty introduced a financial shell game called the Ontario Clean Energy Benefit that ended up adding over $5 billion to the province’s debt.
Ontario appears to be repeating that history now.
Ontario Premier Kathleen Wynne is right now trying to figure out what her government might do to appear to be freezing power rates. One modern twist on the old story is that now the Premier has her new slush fund — cap and trade — to play with.
Given the masterful communications capabilities of the Wynne government, her soon-to-be-announced electricity relief program is sure to have a catchy title to be emblazoned on bills. Folks are invited to suggest suitable marketing slogans in the comments below.
The Ontario governing party with five criminal investigations ongoing including several related to document destruction, the party of pay-for-access policy-for-hire fundraisers, the party that dismisses the Auditor General as confused about many things to do with energy, that is the party that is right now concocting a carbon market in Ontario out of government decrees.
Retired senior finance executive, Bernard Lahey, and I have been in conversation around issues raised in my recent interviews on VOCM radio in Newfoundland and Labrador about the implications of Muskrat Falls for NL’s sovereignty. Bernard has graciously provided comments for publication here as a guest post. Continue reading ‘Guest Post by Bernard Lahey on Muskrat Falls’ »
On Friday, Jan 13, I was a guest on VOCM radio’s “Open Line with Paddy Daly” in Newfoundland and Labrador
Paddy Daly’s style of talk radio assumes that his listeners are following the details of a wide array of complex stories on public policy and that Paddy can attract their attention to his show by testing his guests against his own views. Paddy is among the most well-informed independent authorities in Canada on the topic of Muskrat Falls.
He and I have spoken with each other frequently enough that he is very familiar with my weakest arguments. Quite properly, he focuses on those. Because of the expectation that his listeners are familiar with the background, Paddy will sometimes skip some details, although the intention behind his question is almost always clear. Particularly to assist those who might be new to the Muskrat story, I have added background notes for some of the comments in my exchange with Paddy. Continue reading ‘Debating Sovereignty Implications of Muskrat Madness’ »
Here are the top 10 posts on this website for 2016 rated by pageviews, as well as the top 10 tweets from my @tomadamsenergy Twitter account rated by impressions. Traffic reports from earlier years are filed under the “About Tom Adams” category tab on the right of your screen (for desktop browsers). Continue reading ‘Top 10 Posts and Tweets for 2016’ »
As construction spending on Canada’s largest green energy project — the 824 MW Muskrat Falls hydro-electric project in Labrador undertaken by the provincial government’s energy agency Nalcor — continues, the profoundly harmful character of the project is becoming increasingly obvious. Here are four recent sources updating different aspects of the project that help to explain the scope of the crisis at Muskrat Madness:
– a survey of recent construction developments authored by Des Sullivan, AKA the inestimable Uncle Gnarley, (here)
– a follow-up post by Cabot Martin, a lawyer and former public servant with an investment background in geology and author of the monograph “Muskrat Madness” (here)
– a historical review of the 1969 contract between Hydro-Quebec and Newfoundland with a plea for cooperation and understanding between the provinces and a particular plea for a comprehensive review of whether to finish Muskrat Falls authored by retired Hydro-Quebec financial expert Bernard Lahey (link), and
– an analysis of the implications for power system reliability in Newfoundland arising from the August 8, 2016 Quebec Superior Court decision on the Upper Churchill contract authored sustainable energy consultant Philip Raphals (here with a slightly updated version available below).
These new documents suggest that the current official $11.7 billion cost estimate as reported by the Globe and Mail today has been overtaken by events, that the project potentially poses a risk to the downstream public and worker safety, that the dependable generation capacity likely from Muskrat is far less than official claims, and NL’s necessary partner to make Muskrat physically deliver reliable capacity — Hydro-Quebec — has a long list of reasons to prefer to not be involved. Continue reading ‘Rethink Muskrat Madness’ »